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Introduction  
For much of human history the toxic nature of certain biological substances was not seen as 
essentially different from that of toxic chemicals. Little if any distinction was made between the 
harmful effects of inanimate materials such as arsenic, biological toxins like snake venom, or 
“poisoned” air and other emissions from a plague victim. All were generally considered poisons 
and were sometimes used for hostile purposes. But the discovery in the 19th century that bacteria 
can cause disease led to their categorical distinction. The potential of living microorganisms to be 
used as weapons was formally recognized in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which not only 
prohibited the use in war of poison gas but also of “bacteriological methods of warfare.”[1] The 
prohibition of “bacterial” methods was later understood to apply as well to other biological agents 
such as viruses, fungi, and yeasts 
The protocol, enacted after the widespread employment of chemical poisons in World War I, 
noted that the use of the proscribed weapons was “justly condemned by the general opinion of 
the civilized world.” Still, in subsequent decades several nations continued to develop these 
agents, though they were rarely used. In fact, the only large-scale dissemination of biological 
agents as weapons occurred in the late 1930s and early 1940s when the Japanese released 
plague bacteria and other organisms over Chinese population centers.[2] 
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which was established in 1972, prohibits even the 
development or acquisition of biological and toxin weapons.[3] While many countries complied 
with the prohibition, some did not. After the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was found to have developed a 
biological arsenal. And following the collapse of the Soviet Union, information surfaced about that 
country’s massive biological program.[4] Such treaty violations would have been less likely if the 
BWC included provisions for verification of compliance, as does the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), established in 1993. Unlike the biological treaty, the CWC not only renounces 
chemical weapons but provides for international inspections to confirm compliance and 
punishment of violators.[5] 
Despite the broad condemnation of biological and chemical weapons, some nations and sub-
national groups are still seeking to acquire them. This chapter reviews the unique characteristics 
of bioweapons, concerns about their proliferation, and events in 2001 involving the dissemination 
of powdered anthrax spores through the U.S. mail. 
Characteristics of Biological Weapons  
Toxic biological agents, like chemical, radiological, and nuclear agents, are commonly described 
as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But bioweapons are in many ways unique and should 
be assessed apart from any other weapon. Since bacteria, viruses, and other living 
microorganisms can reproduce, their increasing numbers may render an environment more 
dangerous to humans over time. In the case of radiation, which also can make an area 
uninhabitable, the peak effect occurs at the time of release and then gradually dissipates. But the 
unleashing of a living pathogen could be a springboard to a disease outbreak that can worsen 
over a period of months or years. This is especially true if the agent is contagious like the 
smallpox virus or the plague bacterium, each of which over the millennia have killed hundreds of 
millions of victims. Infected individuals themselves become biological weapons who spread the 
disease to others. One particularly notorious instance occurred between 1346 and 1350 when an 
epidemic caused by the plague bacterium, Yersinia pestis, killed one third of Europe’s 
population.[6] 
Since the advent of 20th century drugs, notably antibiotics and vaccines, many previously 
untreatable diseases are now amenable to prevention and cure. But not all. Some 
microorganisms may be drug resistant or otherwise not responsive to available therapies. 
Moreover, potentially useful medications require timely delivery to be effective. 
Another distinctive aspect of biological weapons is that their harmful effects are usually not 
evident until some period after their release. The launching of a bioattack might not be apparent 
until people become ill perhaps weeks or months after exposure. (In the case of radiation, its 
ultimate carcinogenic effects would not manifest for many years after exposure and the terror 
effects during such a lengthy period are unclear.) The incubation period for anthrax, for example, 
may be as short as few days or as long as two or three months.[7] A final unique aspect of 
biological weapons relates to their size. A lethal volume of microorganisms can be so minuscule 
as to be invisible to the unaided eye. Yet these tiny quantities can have widespread physical and 
psychological effects. Thus, unlike most other weapons, a bioagent is invisible, without smell or 
taste, and with effects that may be long delayed. This combination renders such weapons 
unusually insidious and frightening. But herein lies a paradox. While biological weapons are 
potentially devastating, they often can be easy to protect against. 
The danger from almost all pathogens occurs when they are inhaled. If people in a targeted area 
are able to don gas masks before exposure, protection would be almost certain. Further, if the 
agent is a bacterium, timely administration of appropriate antibiotics often can prevent infection, 
or, if a patient is already ill, provide a cure. For several bacterial as well as viral diseases pre-
exposure vaccination can prevent infection. In the case of viral illness, including smallpox, a 
vaccine may offer protection even if administered several days after an individual has been 
exposed to the causative agent. Thus the effects of many biological weapons, unlike other 
weapons, are amenable to prevention or reversal with post-exposure treatment. 
Categories and Sources of Biological Weapons 
In conjunction with officials in the U.S. military biological defense program, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has listed more than seventy “select agents” that in 
varying degrees can be harmful to humans. The agents include a variety of living organisms such 
as bacteria, viruses, and fungi as well as toxins, which are the poisonous products of an organism. 
Ranked according to their priority of concern, each agent appears under one of three categories: 
A, B, or C. Category A includes agents and diseases of greatest concern and Category C the 
least. Among the Category C items are yellow fever, influenza, rabies, and emerging pathogens 
that could be engineered in the future for mass dissemination.[8] Category B agents are 
described as moderately easy to disseminate and likely to cause low mortality rates. Examples 
include Q Fever, Glanders, ricin toxin, and various food safety threats (such as certain 
Salmonella and E. Coli strains).[9] 
Category A, the highest priority, includes agents that could be easily disseminated or transmitted 
from person to person; cause high mortality and impact on public health; cause panic and social 
disruption; and require special action for public health preparedness. The six select agents 
identified in this category are: 
• Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)  
• Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin)  
• Plague (Yersinia pestis)  
• Smallpox (variola major)  
• Tularemia (Francisella tularensis)  
• Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses [e.g., Ebola, Marburg] and arenaviruses [e.g., Lassa, 
Machupo]) [10]  
Although these six agents all meet Category A criteria, their individual characteristics differ 
markedly. Botulism, unlike the others in this category, is caused by a toxin and not by infection 
from a living organism. Smallpox and the hemorrhagic fevers are caused by viruses and are 
therefore not amenable to antibiotic therapy. They are also highly contagious as is the plague 
bacterium. Anthrax, while not contagious, is considered unusually effective as a potential weapon 
because it is highly durable in spore form and often lethal if inhaled. 
Some select agents are readily accessible while others can be extremely difficult to acquire. Ricin 
is a toxin derived from the castor bean, which can be purchased through the Internet or at 
agriculture feed and supply stores. The toxin itself is part of the waste mash in the production of 
castor oil. On the other hand, viral agents like Ebola and Marburg are difficult to obtain. The 
cause of occasional deadly outbreaks, they are dangerous to handle and are stored in a limited 
number of laboratories. In the case of smallpox, although the disease was eradicated worldwide 
in 1980, samples of the virus are retained at a repository in Russia and one at the CDC in Atlanta 
according to international agreement. Plans to destroy those stocks have been suspended. The 
suspension was due in part to suspicion that illegal samples might be held elsewhere that could 
be obtained by bioterrorists. Accordingly, continued research on the virus was considered 
desirable for defensive purposes.[11] 
A bioagent might be acquired or produced for illicit purposes in a variety of ways. Legitimate 
investigation of virulent agents is common in numerous laboratories engaged in basic research as 
well as in the quest to develop vaccines and antidotes. An unsavory scientist or technician might 
try to obtain a sample from one of these laboratories and develop it as a weapon. A pathogen 
also could unintentionally be released as a result of accident or error and become accessible to 
inappropriate individuals. 
Further, a select agent might be obtained through purchase, stealing, or smuggling. This was an 
explicit concern after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when laboratory security there was 
weakened and scientists who had access to pathogens were losing their jobs. Finally, since many 
agents exist in natural habitats, visiting these locations to acquire bioagents could be yet another 
source. The plague bacterium, for example, is endemic in the southwestern United States where 
field rodents may be infected. A knowledgeable person might seek to cultivate the bacterium from 
a captured animal.   
Group Categories That Pose Potential Threats  
Four group categories can be identified as posing a potential biological weapons (BW) threat. The 
first group consists of countries that are presumed to have BW programs. The number of such 
countries and the extent of the programs are somewhat murky. A U.S. Department of Defense 
publication in 2006 maintained that “more than ten countries have, or are developing, a biological 
warfare capability.”[12] 
Compilations from news and open government sources in recent years included 11 countries with 
presumed BW programs: China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Russia, Syria, 
and Taiwan.[13] At least two of these countries can no longer be considered part of this group. 
Neither biological weapons nor an active program to develop them were found in Iraq after the 
defeat of that country’s regime in 2003. And in 2004 Libya began to dismantle all its 
unconventional weapons programs under international verification.[14] Some analysts have also 
raised doubts that Cuba and perhaps other states are developing bioweapons.[15] 
The number of countries of concern is further reduced when crosschecked against those that are 
named by the U.S. State Department as sponsors of terrorism. This second group category 
includes countries presumed to have a BW program and sponsor terrorism or are otherwise of 
concern. Iran, North Korea, and Syria fit the first two criteria. Cuba may not have a BW program, 
but is on the list of state sponsors of terrorism.[16] Although Russia is not on the terrorism list, its 
refusal to permit outside inspection of some former biological weapons facilities has created 
concerns about its activities.[17] 
A third category includes sub-state groups that are presumed to have BW programs. A U.S. State 
Department report in 2006 noted: “Among present-day terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda is 
believed to have made the greatest effort to acquire and develop biological weapons. U.S. forces 
discovered a partially built biological weapon laboratory near Kandahar after expelling the Taliban 
from Afghanistan.”[18] Al-Qaeda’s interest in developing biological weapons was also confirmed 
in documents and on computers captured in Afghanistan. Whether any biological agents were 
actually developed as weapons is questionable. Author Ron Suskind reported that intelligence 
officials told him that in 2003 the CIA found “extremely virulent” anthrax in an Afghanistan 
laboratory. The claim has not been publicly substantiated by any other authority.[19] 
Besides al-Qaeda, Palestinian terrorist groups including Hamas have expressed interest in 
developing biological and chemical weapons and claimed success in acquiring them.[20] In June 
2006, the Aksa Martyrs Brigades, which is part of the Palestinian Authority, announced it had 
produced “at least 20 different types of biological and chemical weapons.”[21] However doubtful 
the validity of these claims may seem, they cannot be ignored. At the least they are an affront to 
the international norm that deems biological weapons “repugnant to the conscience of mankind,” 
in the words of the BWC. 
The fourth categorical group that poses a potential BW threat includes laboratories around the 
world that are engaged in the development of emerging biotechnologies. Innovations in 
biotechnology are aggressively being pursued in a variety of fields from medicine and agriculture 
to communications and robotics. In 2001, for example, “nano-drugs” were being developed to 
affect gene expression. The intention is to find drugs that might cure disease. But such research 
could as easily lead to the development of drugs that affect gene expression in harmful ways. 
Similarly, the discovery in 2002 of “interfering” RNA molecules offers the potential to block gene 
expression in the pathway of disease. Here too, the technique conceivably could be used for 
harmful purposes—to enhance gene expression that causes disease.[22] 
Concern about such dual use possibility has prompted a report by the National Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) to warn that the “accelerating pace of discovery in the life sciences has 
fundamentally altered the threat spectrum.” This heightened pace renders the immune, 
neurological, and endocrine systems vulnerable to manipulation of bioregulators, a situation 
described in the IOM report as “an increasingly apparent dual-use risk.”[23] 
Other advances in molecular genetics further underscore the growing potential for the misuse of 
new knowledge. In 2002, based on the knowledge of its genetic sequence, the poliovirus was 
synthesized in a laboratory from snippets of DNA that were commercially obtained.[24] Similarly, 
in 2005, scientists synthesized the Spanish flu virus (H1N1) that killed an estimated 50 million 
people in the 1918-1919 pandemic.[25] Although the structures of these viruses are less complex 
than that of the variola virus, which causes smallpox, few doubt that a concerted effort could 
eventually synthesize a host of threat agents including the smallpox virus. 
Thousands of laboratories around the world are engaged in biotechnology and nanotechnology 
research and development. Many are in the U.S. and Europe, but also in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
China, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, and more. Thus, apart from concerns about 
the classical select agents and traditionally understood sources of bioterrorism, advances in 
biotechnology have created an added potential risk from life science research. This recent 
concern has prompted an urgent call for national and international codes of conduct and ethics 
for life scientists.[26] 
Efforts to Block Pathways to BW Proliferation 
Several initiatives to minimize the chances of BW proliferation have been undertaken in recent 
years. Apart from the prohibitions expressed in the BWC and CWC, several countries, known as 
the Australia Group, now exercise export controls over materials that could be used to 
manufacture chemical or biological agents. The group was established in 1985 at the suggestion 
of Australia and has grown to include some forty western oriented countries. Among the lists of 
controlled items for export are the 70-odd select biological agents and dual use biological 
equipment such as centrifuges, fermenters, and freeze dryers.[27] 
Beyond international efforts, several U.S. domestic initiatives have also been undertaken. In 1991, 
for example, congress enacted legislation proposed by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to 
help employ former Soviet weapons scientists in non-military projects.[28] By the mid-1990s 
around 3,000 of more than 100,000 former nuclear-chemical-biological weapons scientists were 
being funded by Nunn-Lugar money for research in non-defense projects.[29] Subsequently, 
more ex-weapons scientists were similarly funded, though underemployment remained a problem 
among ex-Soviet scientists. 
In 1996 a new law required that interstate transfer of select agents from one laboratory to another 
must be registered with the CDC.[30] Prior to enactment of this legislation, laboratories 
exchanged highly virulent microorganisms and toxins without registering the transactions with any 
outside party. Thus records of these exchanges, if they were kept at all, had been entirely within 
the purview of the laboratories. 
The USA Patriot Act, which was enacted after 9/11 and the anthrax attacks, placed restrictions on 
who could have access to select agents in American laboratories. Specifically prohibited were 
nationals of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, or any other country designated 
by the State Department as a sponsor of terrorism.[31] 
However helpful these requirements may have been, they did not address the central issue of 
accountability by laboratories of their stocks of organisms. This situation was belatedly rectified in 
2002 with legislation that requires laboratories to report their possession of select agents and 
register with the CDC.[32] Until passage of this law no party outside the laboratory was 
necessarily aware of which select agents were being stored or investigated in any particular 
laboratory. The earlier 1996 antiterrorism act had required registration with the CDC only if a 
select agent was being sent to or received from another laboratory. 
Beyond legislation, concerns have surfaced about various biological research programs in the 
United States along with notions about how to control them. Richard Ebright, a biochemist at 
Rutgers University, worries that the large increase in governmental spending on bioweapons 
research creates new risks. He estimated that 300 U.S. institutions now have access to live 
bioweapons agents and that 16,500 individuals are approved to work with them. Many of the 
investigators previously had no experience with such organisms but were drawn to study them by 
newly available funds for biodefense research. Their inexperience increases the risk of accidental 
release of these organisms. Ebright also worries that the expanding pool of individuals with 
expertise increases the risk that some will engage in illicit activity.[33] Accordingly, Ebright 
supports reduction of the number of laboratories and investigators dealing with select agents. 
These concerns are focused on the threat associated with the classical agents deemed to be 
potential bioweapons. They have little relationship to the emerging threats associated with 
biotechnology. The complexity of this growing challenge is underscored by the questionable 
effectiveness of proposals by some scientists who seek to enhance protection and prevention. 
George Church, a geneticist at the Harvard medical school suggests licensing the bio-supply 
chain of materials and equipment used in biotechnology. He would require registration of all 
researchers working with select agents or on immune system responses to pathogens as well.[34] 
Given the number of items to register, the proposal seems unworkable. Trying to register DNA 
synthesizers alone would be formidable. A DNA synthesizer costs around $5,000 and there are at 
least 50,000 of them throughout the world. But blueprints for constructing a DNA synthesizer are 
on the Internet, which could allow them to be built without notification to an outside authority.[35] 
Some scientists reveal a sense of futility about trying to curb the dark possibilities of 
biotechnology. Serguei Popov, formerly a germ weapons scientist in the Soviet biological 
weapons program who now works at George Mason University, acknowledges that he sees no 
solution now. But the first step, he suggests, is to make the public aware of the danger.[36] 
Added to the limited ability to control or even monitor the development of illicit weapons is the 
recognition that scientific expertise is for sale. By 1999 at least five former Soviet biological 
weapons scientists reportedly had been hired to work in Iran. Their salaries, around $5,000 per 
month, far exceeded their incomes at home.[37] A survey conducted in 2003 found that 21 
percent of Russian scientists (including physicists, chemists, and biologists) would consider 
working in Iran, Syria, or North Korea for at least one year.[38] 
Developing a nuclear weapon is technically complex and must draw from expertise in several 
fields including mathematics, nuclear and materials physics, chemical and electrical engineering, 
and more. The notorious case of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the reputed Pakistani “father of the Islamic 
bomb,” underscores the point. Khan had stolen design plans to enrich uranium from a Dutch 
centrifuge plant where he worked in the early 1970s. In 1976 he became head of a secret 
Pakistani effort to produce weapons-grade uranium.[39] But it took nearly a decade, billions of 
dollars, and a cadre of Western-trained trained physicists and engineers before Pakistan’s 
centrifuges began to produce highly enriched uranium. Another ten years passed before Pakistan 
actually tested a weapon.[40] 
By contrast, in the biological sphere, a lone individual with a modicum of microbiology laboratory 
training, and with access to a select agent, could produce a biological arsenal in a few weeks. 
The effectiveness of an agent as a weapon varies according to the nature of the organism and 
the form of production. Virulent anthrax bacteria, for example, can easily be produced in a wet 
form by growing the organism in a nutrient medium. But an unrefined mixture of moist anthrax 
spores would be less potent than a dry product that could float and easily be inhaled. A more 
challenging next step would be to process the dry spores, which tend to cling to each other, as 
individual particles. Free floating individual spores, after being inhaled, could more easily reach 
the alveoli at the end of the respiratory tree. There they are engulfed by macrophages, white cells 
that ordinarily destroy foreign particles. But once inside a macrophage an anthrax spore can 
transform into a reproducing organism that releases lethal toxin. 
In February 2003, while addressing the UN Security Council, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell 
held aloft a small vial of white powder. In emphasizing the dangers of biological weapons he said, 
“Less than a teaspoonful of dry anthrax, a little bit, about this amount . . . shut down the United 
States Senate in the fall of 2001.”[41] Powell was speaking on the eve of the invasion of Iraq by 
U.S.-led coalition forces and was warning about that regime’s presumed arsenal of anthrax and 
other non-conventional weapons. 
After the invasion no such weapons were found, but Powell’s description of the effect of the 
poison powder was, if anything, understated. Not only the Senate but the entire Capitol was 
closed along with the office buildings of members of the Senate and House of Representatives. 
At various periods during the anthrax scare in the fall of 2001, reports of spores elsewhere 
resulted in the shutting down of much of official Washington. Actual or suspected anthrax 
contamination prompted closing parts of the Pentagon, the Federal Reserve Building, offices of 
the State Department, the Supreme Court, and major postal facilities.[42] A review of the anthrax 
events offers an instructive account of the only intentional bioattack in the United States known to 
have resulted in the loss of life. 
The Anthrax Attack Through the U.S. Mail 
The anthrax bacterium has long been considered a prime biological weapon. In spore form, the 
organism is hardy, durable, and potentially lethal if inhaled. During World War II, British and 
American experiments demonstrated that the inhalation of airborne spores would kill livestock 
and, presumably, humans. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Army conducted hundreds of germ warfare tests in populated 
areas throughout the United States. Mock biowarfare agents were released from boats, slow-
flying airplanes, automobiles, germ-packed lightbulbs, perforated suitcases, and wind-generating 
machines. The test agents included the bacteria Serratia marcescens and Bacillus subtilitis, and 
the chemical zinc cadmium sulfide. (Although less dangerous than real warfare agents, the test 
bacteria and chemicals posed some risks.) Cities and states including San Francisco, 
Minneapolis, St. Louis, and parts of Illinois, Ohio, and Hawaii were blanketed with these agents. 
Some attacks were more focused, such as those in which bacteria were released in the New York 
subway and on the Pennsylvania Turnpike. In each instance, the spread and survivability of the 
bacteria were measured to assess the country’s vulnerability to a germ attack.[43] But apparently 
the testers never considered the U.S. mail as a possible vehicle. In the fall of 2001, the 
effectiveness of the mail as a delivery system suddenly became evident. 
On October 4, 2001, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed a 
Florida state laboratory finding that a 63-year-old man tested positive for anthrax. The patient, 
Robert Stevens, was a photo-editor for the Sun, a supermarket tabloid published by American 
Media, Inc. (AMI) in Boca Raton. He died the next day. The cause was inhalation anthrax, an 
infection resulting from breathing in the bacterium. Inhalation anthrax is so rare that only eighteen 
cases in the United States had been recorded in the 20th century. The most recent instance 
before 2001 was in 1976 when a California weaver was infected by spores from wool that had 
been imported from Pakistan.[44] 
In the wake of 9/11, and with recent publicity about anthrax as a potential biological weapon, 
some people suspected that Stevens’s infection might be associated with bioterrorism. But 
federal and state officials initially discounted that possibility. State public health authorities in 
Florida and North Carolina, where Stevens had just vacationed, insisted that his infection in no 
way implied terrorism. Tommy Thompson, the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
flatly declared, “There is no terrorism.”[45] 
Meanwhile, CDC officials investigated dozens of places that Stevens had frequented in the 
months before his diagnosis. They collected samples and swabbed surfaces for analysis in 
restaurants, shops, parks, his home in Lantana, and his workplace in the AMI building. On 
October 7, two days after his death, tests indicated the presence of anthrax spores on Stevens’s 
computer keyboard and in the AMI mailroom. These findings made clear that the dismissal of 
bioterrorism as a possible cause of his death had been premature. During the following weeks 
Bacillus anthracis was found to have infected residents of Washington DC and of seven east 
coast states: Florida, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut. 
All told, eleven people were stricken with inhalation anthrax including the five who died. Another 
eleven had contracted the less dangerous cutaneous form of the disease and all survived.[46] 
The last reported case was a 94-year old Connecticut woman who died of inhalation anthrax on 
November 21. During the two-month roll out of infections, it became understood that the 
bacterium had been disseminated through the United States mail. Most victims were postal 
workers or otherwise known to have been in contact with contaminated mail. Four letters, each 
containing 1-2 grams of dry anthrax spores, were found during this period. All were postmarked 
“Trenton, NJ” which meant they were mailed in the Princeton-Trenton area and processed at the 
Postal Sorting and Distribution Center (PSDC) in nearby Hamilton, New Jersey. Two envelopes 
were postmarked September 18, 2001, one addressed to the editor of the New York Post and the 
other to Tom Brokaw at NBC-TV. The message on a sheet inside was a copy of an original that 
evidently was kept by the mailer. Under “09-11-01,” in handwritten block letters, the text read: 
This is next 
Take penacilin [sic] now 
Death to america 
Death to israel 
Allah is great[47] 
The other two recovered envelopes, postmarked October 9, 2001, were addressed to Senator 
Tom Daschle and Senator Patrick Leahy. The text in both letters was identical, though somewhat 
different from the wording in the first pair. Dated “09-11-01” they read: 
You cannot stop us. 
We have this anthrax. 
You die now. 
Are you afraid? 
Death to America. 
Death to Israel. 
Allah is great.[48] 
Anthrax letters were presumably also sent to the ABC and CBS television studios in New York as 
well as the offices of the Sun and another AMI tabloid, the National Inquirer. This assumption is 
based on the trails of spores found in these places and the identification of infected individuals 
who had been in their proximity. Since the envelope flaps were sealed with tape the anthrax 
spores, each around one micron in diameter, apparently had been leaking through the envelope 
paper whose pores exceeded twenty microns in size. Although bacteria could have been 
transported to these locations by cross-contaminated mail, their large concentrations suggested 
the likely source was an original threat letter. 
In most instances, initial diagnoses of the victims failed to include anthrax as a possible cause of 
their illness. Nor was the extent of contamination in scores of buildings, offices, and postal 
facilities quickly recognized. As succeeding days and weeks brought information about more 
victims and contaminated locations, the public became increasingly anxious. The actual presence 
of spores, along with several false alarms prompted not only federal buildings in Washington DC 
to shut down but several offices along the eastern seaboard and a postal facility as far west as 
Kansas City, Missouri.[49] People everywhere were afraid to open mail. 
Despite generating massive disruption the anthrax attacks resulted in relatively few casualties. 
But they demonstrated the potential for more devastating consequences. More than 30,000 
people who were considered at risk from exposure to the bacterium were treated with 
prophylactic antibiotics.[50] Without this intervention, many of them might well have become 
infected and died. Moreover, if the strain of bacterium had been drug resistant, or if hundreds of 
anthrax letters had been mailed, the number of deaths and illnesses would surely have been 
greater. 
While much is known about the 2001 anthrax attacks, many issues remain unresolved. Some 
have less bearing than others on blocking pathways to proliferation and use. For example, issues 
related to the recovery of the infected victims, decontamination of infected locations, or the 
enormous financial consequences of the attacks, while important, have little bearing on 
understanding how the anthrax was acquired and used. But other facts, challenges, and lessons 
are more directly related to the pathways toward this bioattack. Four of these issues in particular 
bear on preparedness and protection. 
First, launching a bioattack can be as simple as dropping a letter into a mailbox, which is how the 
anthrax assault began. Although acquiring and processing the organism could pose challenges, 
releasing it as an instrument of terror could not be easier. However, only certain agents can 
effectively be conveyed by mail—those that are durable and potent in powder form. These 
characteristics apply especially to spore forming bacteria like anthrax, and toxins such as 
botulinum toxin or ricin. Viral agents, such as those that cause hemorrhagic fever, are transmitted 
largely through person-to-person contact. The smallpox virus cannot even survive outside a 
human host unless maintained under certain laboratory conditions, and therefore would pose no 
threat by mail. 
Second, the anthrax attack demonstrates how difficult finding the perpetrator can be. Efforts to 
pinpoint the source of the anthrax and whoever mailed it have been elusive. Despite an intensive 
effort by the FBI to identify the culprit, five years after the attack no one has been charged. The 
case is all the more frustrating because so much information is available about the mailings. The 
fact that the powdered bacteria were sent with threat messages that identified the contents as 
anthrax, made finding several letters easier. Another informative feature included the markings on 
the recovered envelopes that revealed the dates and times they were processed and at which 
postal centers they were sorted. Finally, bacteria were isolated not only from victims but from the 
recovered letters, which enabled DNA matching and analysis from both sources. Yet even with all 
this information, the identity of the perpetrator(s) is still uncertain. His/their motivation and base of 
operation remain speculative. 
Third, the anthrax attack provided information about a method of delivery not previously 
appreciated. The dissemination of a tiny volume of powdered spores was surprisingly widespread. 
A Canadian experiment in early 2001 demonstrated that spores in letters could readily disperse 
after an envelope was slit open. The experiment was conducted in a confined chamber with 
simulated anthrax powder.[51] But that study hardly foretold the extensive leakage that could 
occur even from unopened letters and the resulting large-scale contamination of buildings and 
pieces of other mail. The total volume of powder in all the anthrax letters was less than a handful 
(an estimated 7-14 grams). Yet the powder became broadly dispersed and prompted widespread 
anxiety. 
Fourth, the attack highlighted the challenge of diagnosing illness caused by a select agent. As the 
outbreak in 2001 showed, healthcare workers often failed to consider anthrax in their differential 
diagnoses. Most physicians who examined patients with cutaneous anthrax presumed their 
lesions were attributable either to a spider bite or to an unknown cause. Similarly, many doctors 
who saw patients with the inhalation form of the disease ascribed their illness to a viral infection 
devoid of sinister implications. Few healthcare professionals considered anthrax at the outset.[52] 
This failure was compounded by a general lack of skill and equipment to test accurately for 
anthrax. 
The CDC began to create a laboratory response network in 1999 that would broadly enhance the 
nation’s ability to identify anthrax and other agents. By 2001 only a limited number of local and 
state facilities were capable of testing for select agents. That capacity has expanded and now 
numbers more than 140 laboratories throughout the country including those at federal agencies 
and military installations.[53] Presumably these laboratories can now confirm the presence or 
absence of select agents more quickly and accurately than was possible five years ago. Still, a 
large infusion of samples requiring quick testing would still strain the system. Moreover, while 
awareness of the threat of bioterrorism has doubtless grown in the medical community since 
2001, whether doctors are now more likely to consider anthrax or other select agent illnesses in 
their differential diagnoses remains uncertain. 
Conclusion 
In reviewing the nature of biological weapons, their potential sources, and how they might be 
used, it becomes clear that blocking their acquisition is a formidable challenge. No policies can 
ensure that a determined state or group will be deprived of a biological arms capability. But this 
fact does not negate the need to minimize the chances of that eventuality. In this regard, 
traditional methods of oversight, such as surveillance and intelligence, are essential. Domestic 
regulation and export controls, as discussed previously, are also vital. These efforts can be 
buttressed by underscoring the universal understanding that the use of biological agents as 
weapons should be rejected on moral grounds. This moral understanding is at the core of the 
1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. In both these international 
agreements, the use of biological weapons is posed as an effrontery to the civilized world. 
Still, some states and sub-state groups have defied this universal precept, and the threat of 
bioweapons must continue to be addressed. A helpful step would be to strengthen the BWC by 
adding provisions for verification of compliance. This would include visits by international 
inspectors to a country’s laboratories and other relevant facilities. Violators of the treaty would be 
subject to punishment including sanctions and force. Although sub-state groups are not directly 
affected by the terms of the BWC, strengthening the norm against biological weapons could 
influence behavior even among terrorist groups. In a society that vigorously condemns the 
possession of such weapons, pressure on all groups not to violate the norm would be greater. 
Still, the threat, even if lessened, will not be eliminated. The need for preparedness and the ability 
to respond to a bioattack will persist as long as the threat persists. 
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